Comments on: A fault line or faulty information? The Taliban, reconciliation, and audacious claims https://www.smartwar.org/blog/2012/09/a-fault-line-or-faulty-information-the-taliban-reconciliation-and-audacious-claims/ A blog about conflict simulation & wargaming Sat, 17 Oct 2020 19:40:49 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.2 By: Robert Hossal https://www.smartwar.org/blog/2012/09/a-fault-line-or-faulty-information-the-taliban-reconciliation-and-audacious-claims/#comment-47 Sun, 14 Oct 2012 16:48:08 +0000 http://www.smartwar.org/?p=1321#comment-47 In reply to Theo Farrell.

I could have worded that sentence better. What I meant is that the point about US military bases was presented in media reports and blog posts as indicative of a wider Taliban policy (not in the report itself). As you say, the report does NOT claim that; my problem is with the journalists and bloggers who conveniently skip over the context provided in the report to casually make that claim (with the knowledge that most of their readers will probably not go to the original report and read it themselves). It’s like a bad game of telephone.

As for your first point, I said a single individual because the section on US military bases on page 12 primarily cites interviewee B. While A and C are mentioned in the last paragraph of that section, it seemed B was mainly offering the idea of the Taliban accepting US troops on the ground.

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By: Theo Farrell https://www.smartwar.org/blog/2012/09/a-fault-line-or-faulty-information-the-taliban-reconciliation-and-audacious-claims/#comment-46 Sun, 14 Oct 2012 16:24:40 +0000 http://www.smartwar.org/?p=1321#comment-46 “The more likely answer is that the authors of the RUSI report simply received a single individual’s opinion, which was then enthusiastically presented as being more informative and indicative of a wider sentiment among Taliban leaders than it really is.”

May I suggest that you read the report more carefully. We are clear on two things:

(a) Our report is based on the opinions of four individuals, not one. Each was interviewed separately and at length. We triangulate views to get better confidence that they represent the views of others within the QST leadership. Thus, our key finding that the QST take a pragmatic view towards a long-term US presence in Afghanistan, beyond any cease-fire, is based on what we heard from all four interviewees.

(b) We are clear that our report does not demonstrate any change in Taliban policy. Rather it offers insights into the tantalising possibilities for reconciliation. We think that we have captured the view of the more moderate wing within the QST leadership. But we are unable to assess the extent to which moderates are in the ascendency within the QST, and accordingly the extent to which these views may be translated into outcomes in any possible peace talks.

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